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I. INTRODUCrION
The 1993-1994 privatizations of French public companies have
been conducted in an atmosphere of innovation among French
lawmakers and politicians. The sale of French industries under French
Privatization Law No. 86-912 of August 6, 1986 (as modified by Law
No. 93-923 of July 19, 1993, the "Privatization Law")' with the use of
novel financing methods has dynamized French capital markets. The
Privatization Law and recent developments in French stock exchange
regulations have permitted France to use privatization as a legal labo-
ratory for testing share placement and distribution techniques devel-
oped both in France and abroad. Implementation of the Privatization
Law marks a convergence of French and American marketing prac-
tices in addition to reflecting lessons learned from privatizations con-
ducted in other countries.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE PRIVATIZATION LAW
IN FRANCE
It is because of two waves of nationalizations, one right after the
second World War, the other in 1982 following President Mitterand's
first election and the victory of leftist parties in the Parliamentary
elections of 1981, that privatization has a place in the economic pic-
ture of France today. In 1945, devastated by war and weighed down
* Avocats A la Cour (Paris) and Attorneys-at-Law (New York), Rogers and Wells.
1 Law No. 93-923 of July 19,1993, [1993] J.O. 21 Juillet at 10,255,1993 D.S.L. at 396 [herein-
after Privatization Law], modifies and completes Law No. 86-912 of August 6,1986, [1993] J.O. 7
Auot at 9695, 1986 D.S.L. at 430 [hereinafter Law 86-912]. Law 93-923 was renamed the "Law




by massive unemployment, France embraced the Keynesian idea of
State intervention to revitalize its national economy.2 France, as well
as several of its European neighbors, commenced the nationalization
of its base industries, such as its steel and coal producers, as well as its
three largest deposit banks. This nationalization effort has been given
partial credit for France's ability to pull itself up from the brink of
financial disaster during the three decades following the war.
With the decade of the 1970's came the fruition of an economic
doctrine that viewed public sector industry more critically. Modem
economists saw entrenched public sector industries as impediments to
a dynamic market economy based on free competition among busi-
nesses. During this period of doctrinal transition, international finan-
cial institutions such as the World Bank and the Organization of
Economic Community and Development (OECD) encouraged third
world countries to sell off their public enterprises. Third world priva-
tizations on a small scale began taking place long before the idea of
privatization was to be accepted in England or France.
In fact, despite this turning tide of global economic thinking, in
1982, France engaged in the most sweeping wave of nationalizations
seen anywhere in Europe since the immediate post-war period.3 This
spate of nationalizations was widely debated. For many, nationaliza-
tion was clearly incompatible with the new ethos of market liberaliza-
tion then being manifested in the global economy. The political
controversy over nationalization versus privatization continued in
France throughout the 1980s. When the moderate right-wing Govern-
ment, newly-elected in March 1986, instituted the initial legal regime
for the privatization of certain public industries in France, Socialist
President Mitterand refused to sign the Government ordinance meant
to put the new privatization law4 into effect. Further privatization leg-
islation was prepared and passed into law on August 6, 1986,5 setting
out the regulatory framework for a new French privatization
program.6
2 Post-war France was also influenced by Communist ideals supporting State-owned indus-
try as well as an historical tendency (since the days of Louis XIV's Finance Minister Colbert) to
centralize decision-making and administration in Paris.
3 Law No. 82-155 of February 11, 1982, [1982] J.O. 13 Fevr. at 566, 1982 D.S.L. at 92.
4 Law No. 86-793 of July 2, 1986, [1986] J.O. 3 Juillet at 8240, 1986 D.S.L at 391.
5 Law No. 86-912, supra note 1.
6 Twenty-nine of sixty-five major businesses and banks authorized for privatization were
sold under the 1986 Law (through twelve privatizations, some of which involved both parent and
subsidiary companies listed in the 1986 Law) including some (CCF, Compagnie G6n6rale
d'Electricit6 (now known as Alcatel Alsthom), Matra, Paribas and Suez) that had been national-
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Nevertheless, due to the global stock market crash of October
1987, the first wave of privatizations in France was short-lived. The
Socialist Government that followed remained in power from 1988-
1993 and was dominated by a determination to do nothing.7 President
Mitterand pronounced his commitment to the status quo in the often-
repeated catchword known as "ni-ni"8 meaning "neither [national-
ization] nor [privatization]", and France's privatization program, al-
though not its capital markets, stood at a near stand-still until a new
Government was elected in 1993.
Despite President Mitterand's "ni-ni" declaration, major public
sector French industries such as Pechiney and Rh6ne-Poulenc were
able to sell off some of their international subsidiaries during the
1988-1993 period. The French capital markets clearing system was
modernized and stock brokerage companies (socigts de bourse) were
introduced in France in place of exchange agents (agents de change),
individuals who held a monopoly on the trading and pricing of shares
at the bourse. The soci~tds de bourse, regulated by the newly-created
Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs (CBV),9 were permitted to have the
equity backing from major French and international banks that had
not been previously possible without ceding control to the individual
exchange agent. Although the socidtds de bourse maintain the monop-
oly on share trading and pricing on the French stock exchanges, sub-
ject to limited exceptions,10 the infusion of capital from within and
outside France was a welcome financial boost after the stock market
crisis of 1987. Other capital markets developments in France included
the trading of futures and options on the newly opened Paris futures
exchange, March6 d Terme International de France, originally named
Marchg d Terme des Instruments Financiers (MATIF),11 and the Paris
options exchange, Marchg des Options N~gotiables de Paris
ized in 1982; others (Havas and Socidtd Grndrale) had been nationalized in the immediate post-
war period.
7 Although the 1986 Law prescribed a five-year privatization period, economic conditions in
late 1987 quickly soured for placing shares on the market and, with the election of a left-of-
center Government, the privatization program was effectively shelved in 1988.
8 The "ni-ni" requirement was first set out by President (then candidate) Mitterand in a
1988 position paper. Francois Mitterand, La Lettre d Tous Les FranFais (Letter to the French
People), LE MONDE, May 27, 1988.
9 The Conseil des Bourses de Valeurs was created in 1988 pursuant to Law No. 88-70 of
January 22, 1988, [1988] J.0. 23 Janv. at 1111, 1988 D.S.L. at 132 [hereinafter Law 88-70], as a
professional organization charged with the promulgation of general stock market regulations,
control over stock market listings and delistings and was given disciplinary authority over the
socidt~s de bourse.
10 Id. art. 1.
11 MATIF opened in February 1986.
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(MONEP).' 2 As a result of these developments, new product trades
and trading technology grew in volume and complexity while in-
creased investment began to flow in from abroad.
The return of center to right-wing politicians to the Government
in March 1993 also marked the resurrection of privatization in France.
The new Government quickly implemented a modified privatization
law, the 1993 Law. As will be described below, the 1993 Law intro-
duced several innovations not seen under the 1986 Law while main-
taining the emphasis on favoring the development of individual
shareholders in France and the opportunity for employees to become
shareholders in the companies that employ them. Under both the
1986 and 1993 elements of the Privatization Law, the protection of
French national interests, or certain limitations on foreign ownership
of French privatized industries, remained a common theme.
III. FRENCH CAPITAL MARKETS AND INVESTOR FINANCING FOR
THE 1993 PRIVATIZATIONS
The transfer of public enterprises to the private sector during
1986-1988 was largely targeted towards individual French investors in
an effort to achieve a more "populist" capitalism. Although the
number of potential private investors in France is large,13 attracting
investment in privatized companies during a time of relative economic
hardship was not seen as a straightforward proposition. Prior to the
1986 privatizations, there were fewer than two million French individ-
uals owning shares in French companies listed on the French stock
exchanges. Just after the 1986-88 wave of privatizations, however, this
number grew to 6.2 million individual investors. As is typical for
French privatizations, however, many investors sell their newly ac-
quired shares in privatized companies within six months of purchase,
cashing in on quick profits due in part to the traditionally low initial
offering price of the shares. By early 1993, the number of French indi-
viduals invested in French stocks had dropped to 4.5 million.14 Thus,
one challenge of the 1993 privatization campaign was not only to at-
12 MONEP opened in September 1987.
13 The population of France is approximately fifty-eight million people. In 1991, less than
ten percent of the total population in France were directly investing in the stock market; in the
United States, roughly fifteen percent. These figures do not include bond or mutual fund inves-
tors. Commission des Op6rations de Bourse 1991, Rapport au President de la Rdpublique, at 46.
14 Commission des Op6rations de Bourse 1993, Rapport au President de la R~publique, at 98
[hereinafter 1993 COB Report]. These statistics are based on surveys conducted by Softs, a
French polling company. The margin of error was not reported.
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tract French private investors but also to keep them invested in the
newly privatized companies over the long-term. 15
The 1993 Law set out twenty-one groups of State-owned enter-
prises selected for the auction block, including companies originally
chosen in 1986 but not yet privatized as well as groups (such as Re-
nault) that were considered too politically sensitive to be considered
for privatization in 1986. To focus the attention of the investing pub-
lic, the Government again sponsored television and print campaigns
for its privatizations as it had done in 1986-87. With an advertising
budget of sixty to eighty million francs per transaction, the Govern-
ment's privatization publicity blitz has had a broad reach, occasionally
including celebrity spokesmen to help sell its multibillion franc wares.
Already in October 1993, the privatization of Banque Nationale de
Paris (BNP) earned the Government 22 billion francs in revenue
while in January 1994, Elf Aquitaine, the fourth enterprise privatized
under the 1993 wave of privatizations, brought in 34.9 billion francs
and Rh6ne-Poulenc's second tranche was sold for 23 billion francs.' 6
Increases in trading volume on the French financial exchanges in
1993 can be credited in part to the increasing participation of investors
from abroad. Attracted by speculation that the French economy was
emerging from the European recession and by publicity concerning
the 1993 privatization program, British, American, and Middle-East-
ern investors and arbitrage experts, among others, invested in France.
Foreign investors in 1993 accounted for one-third of France's market
capitalization. Similarly, one-third of all stock brokerage firms
(socigts de bourses) were c6ntrolled by foreign interests and forty
percent of MATIF members, participants in the Paris futures ex-
change, were foreign institutions.'7
The overall market capitalization on the Paris bourse at the end
of 1993 amounted to nearly 2.7 trillion francs,'" a small amount com-
pared to the size of the entire French economy. Part of the reason for
this imbalance may be due to the scarcity of large, internationally
15 A new survey entitled "Porteurs des Actions", published September 29, 1994, by the Com-
mission des Optrations de Bourse and commissioned by the Commission des Opirations de
Bourse, the Banque de France and the Socidtd des Bourses Frangaises indicates that the number
of individual direct shareholders in French companies at year-end 1993 had increased to 5.7
million, an improvement over 1992 figures and yet disappointing for not having reached the 6.2
million level attained during the 1987 privatizations.
16 The Government's shareholdings in Rh6ne-Poulenc were divested in separate tranches
over time. The first tranche of Rh6ne-Poulenc was sold to the public in 1986. The second
tranche was sold in November 1993.
17 1993 COB Report, supra note 14, at 85-86.
18 1993 COB Repor4 supra note 14, at 81.
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known industries listed on the Paris bourse. One of the Government's
ambitions in implementing its new wave of privatizations was to en-
hance Paris' standing as a financial center in Europe by bringing ma-
jor companies to its market.
The Privatization Law opened the entire competitive sector of
French industry to both French investors and members of the Euro-
pean Union in general, through privatization. Under the 1986 priva-
tization program, all industries proposed for privatization under the
1986 Law had to be privatized within a five-year period. Through the
1993 Law industry list that became part of the Privatization Law, Par-
liament gave a clear mandate to the Government to recommence
privatizations of State assets while prescribing no particular time
frame for their sale.
Financial Incentives/Employee Tranche
As part of the preparation for the 1993 privatization program, the
Government offered generous financial and tax incentives for French
investors to transfer their savings to French stocks and bonds. The
Government sought ways to encourage stock investments in an envi-
ronment where most individual investors were keeping their savings in
liquid, low-risk, money market funds. A new law gave tax incentives
to investors who agreed to roll their money market funds (SICAV
mon~taires) directly into longer-term stock investment plans (plan
d'dpargne en actions).19 New investments in these stock plans could
also be used for the purchase of shares in privatized companies. In
addition, the "Balladur Bond," a Government bond issue launched in
the summer of 1993, raised one hundred and ten billion francs (19.3
billion dollars) and gave French citizen holders of the bond the option
to convert their holdings into shares in companies sold by the State,
tax-free, on a priority basis over other investors.2"
The Privatization Law requires that ten percent of the shares sold
by the Government in a public offering be reserved for purchase by
employees of that company or of its directly or indirectly majority-
owned subsidiaries, or by former employees having served at least five
years with the company or any such subsidiary.2' This employee
tranche can prove difficult to fill without offering employees, whose
19 Law No. 93-859 of June 22, 1993, art. 28, [1993] J.O. 23 Juin at 8815, 1993 D.S.L. at 377.
20 Id. art. 9. See also Decree No. 93-862 of June 23, 1993, [1993] J.O. 24 Juin at 8901. The
Balladur Bond issue was expected to raise thirty billion francs. Nearly four times that amount
was actually sold. See Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 13(IV).
21 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 11.
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resources are often limited, special incentives to purchase company
shares. Thus, the Privatization Law provides price discounts and sup-
plemental extended terms of payment for the sale of shares in the
employee tranche. The discounted offering price for the employee
tranche may not exceed twenty percent of the lowest offering price
proposed to any other investor in the privatization.22 An employee
acquiring shares through the employee tranche must hold them for a
period of two years and may not sell them thereafter until they are
fully paid. These modified placement incentives were designed to al-
leviate problems associated with the traditional solution of offering
shares at deep discounts to employees. Under the 1986 Law em-
ployee tranche mechanism, employees tended to quickly resell their
employee tranche shares on the secondary market for a fast profit.
In addition to statutory incentives, the Government looked to the
private sector for financing innovations to ensure greater participation
from employee investors. One such successful financial plan was de-
veloped by Bankers Trust Company. The Bankers Trust solution, de-
vised with respect to the Rh6ne-Poulenc privatization, helped
employees increase their purchasing power and protected them
against a decline in their investment. For every share purchased by an
employee, a French bank lent that employee enough money to
purchase an additional nine shares. In addition, the employees were
guaranteed that they would recover, at the least, their initial invest-
ment in the shares plus a minimal yield.
Personal loans for the purchase of additional shares in Rh6ne-
Poulenc were ultimately provided to the employees by Credit Com-
mercial de France (CCF) and guaranteed by Bankers Trust, allowing
the employees to purchase ten times the number of shares that their
personal contributions would have purchased alone. To benefit from
certain tax advantages, the employees acquired their shares through
an employee savings plan and agreed to hold them in the plan for a
period of five years. The personal loans to employees, tied to a
matching five-year amortization period, would be reimbursed from
the proceeds realized upon the sale of the shares from the savings
plan.
If the proceeds prove inadequate to reimburse the loans under
this particular employee incentive plan, Bankers Trust will pay the
shortfall to CCF under its guarantee plus a twenty-five percent mini-
mum yield to the employee investors. As Bankers Trust has hedged
22 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art 11.
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its guarantees to the employees by holding options on the stock itself
and through swap option agreements with CCF, it has minimized its
risk of loss if the guarantee is called into play. To pay for the coverage
of the guarantee and the loan, the employees agreed that thirty-four
percent of the gains realized on their shares (including the shares ac-
quired through loan financing) would be paid to Bankers Trust and
CCF as fees.23
Special French tax and banking law considerations compelled
Rh6ne-Poulenc to offer this financing package exclusively to its
French employees. Despite its complexity, the loan/guarantee financ-
ing operation for the employee tranche was warmly received. The
French employees oversubscribed by two-fold the employee allotment
offered to them. As a result, eighty-three percent of the employees at
Rh6ne-Poulenc became shareholders of the company. It is expected
that both private and Government financial incentives will continue to
be employed in future privatizations.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF FRENCH PRIVATIZATIONS
The privatization of a French public company listed in the Priva-
tization Law is initiated by a ddcret of the Government. 24 The offering
price per share is then set by the Minister of the Economy with advice
from the Privatization Commission. The 1986 Law first created the
concept of a Privatization Commission, renamed in 1988 the Commis-
sion for the Valuation of Public Enterprises,25 to value the companies
to be privatized. The 1993 Law re-established the Privatization Com-
mission and gave it expanded powers. Not only is the Privatization
Commission authorized to evaluate and set a minimum price for the
public company to be privatized, but it also selects members of the
noyau dur or group of stable shareholders who purchase a percentage
of the company's shares by off-market placement and determines the
terms of such placement, subject to confirmation by the Minister of
the Economy.2
6
A. The Noyau Dur or Group of Stable Shareholders
The noyau dur is a French invention aimed at reducing two per-
ceived risks in the privatization of a State enterprise: (1) the absence
23 Rhone-Pouenc Innove Pour Convaincre Ses Salaries, 295 OPTION FINANCE, Feb. 21,
1994, at 21, 31-32.
24 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art 2(11).
25 D~cret No. 88-1054 of November 22, 1988, [1988] J.O. 24 Nov. at 14617, 1988 D.S.L. 469.
26 Privatization Law, supra note 1, arts. 3 & 4.
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of a shareholder base concerned with the future of the company, its
market strategy and development, and (2) the potential intervention
by an undesirable third party that could take advantage of the share-
holder power vacuum created by selling up to one hundred percent of
the company's shares onto the market. Although most companies to
be privatized already have some shareholders other than the State, the
threat of acquisition by unfriendly investors compelled the Govern-
ment to set aside a percentage of shares to be privately placed with a
group of hand-picked, stable shareholders that would become the
noyau dur, or hard core shareholders of the company.27
Although the 1993 Law provides for the possibility of off-market
placement of a tranche of shares in a privatization,' the most impor-
tant document related to the creation of the stable shareholder group,
the cahier des charges, is not mentioned in the law or in any decree
relating to privatizations. Nevertheless, the cahier des charges, a type
of general conditions of sale specific to the company being privatized,
is where the term "group of stable shareholders" appears. It includes
the number of shares to be privately placed, the sale price, and the
minimum and maximum amounts that may be purchased by a single
investor. The cahier des charges also provides for pre-emption rights
among the stable shareholder group that normally applies to eighty
percent of the privately placed shares and remains effective for a three
year period. The pre-emption pact annexed to the general conditions
serves as a contract among the members of the shareholder group
rather than a simple agreement between each investor and the
Government.
When the noyau dur concept was first introduced under the 1986
Law, critics complained that the choice of investors for the stable
group was too politically motivated because the Minister of the Econ-
omy alone made the choice. Under the 1993 Law, the choice of stable
group members may be made by the Minister of the Economy only in
accordance with the consent of the Privatization Commission.2 9 Pur-
suant to a d~cret issued in 1993, however, the choice of investors re-
mains limited to those candidates pre-selected by the Minister of the
Economy.30 Thus, the issue remains that, despite the veto rights of
the Privatization Commission, there is no fixed criteria as to the Min-
27 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 4.
28 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 4
29 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 5.




ister's initial selection of the candidate pool and the noyau dur con-
cept remains susceptible to the initial criticism of political favoritism.
B. The Action Spicifique or Golden Share
The Golden Share concept had already been introduced into
French privatizations in 1986 following the example of Great Britain
in its privatizations of Jaguar, Britoil, and British Aerospace.3 At
that time, however, the Government's Golden Share consisted only of
a five-year right to block any acquisition of more than ten percent of a
privatized company by any investor or concerted group of investors.32
The Golden Share was never a true shareholding but rather a protec-
tionist legal facility that gave the Government added control over the
eventual ownership of its newly privatized companies. Under the
1986-88 wave of privatizations, the Government exercised its Golden
33Share rights in only two instances.
The 1993 Law strengthened the clout of the Government's
Golden Share. The 1986 Law had already allowed the Government,
prior to the privatization of a company, to determine if national inter-
ests require the creation of a Golden Share by arrtg as to that com-
pany.34 Under the modified Privatization Law this determination
gives the Government the right to issue a d'ecret reserving for the
Government certain veto and control rights over the company to be
privatized.35 Among the rights reserved for the Government are its
ability to block the acquisition of shares or voting rights in a privatized
company by any single investor or group of investors beyond
whatever threshold limit is set in the decree. Thus, the ten percent
acquisition trigger of the 1986 Golden Share was abandoned so as to
allow the Government to intercede as deemed appropriate on a case-
by-case basis. Moreover, unlike the 1986 Law's five-year rule, no time
limit applies to the Government's exercise of its 1993 Golden Share
rights. The Golden Share also allows the Government to name one or
two non-voting directors to the governing board of the newly priva-
tized company.36 Finally, as the goal of the Golden Share is basically
protectionist, the Privatization Law gives the Government veto power
31 Report of the Finance Commission, No. 392 Doc. Ass. Nat. 87s (1992-1993).
32 Law 86-912, supra note 1, art. 10.
33 The Government reserved for itself Golden Share rights in four companies: Havas, Matra,
Elf-Aquitaine, and Bull. Only Havas and Matra were actually privatized during the 1986 wave
of privatizations.
34 Law 86-912, supra note 1, art. 10.
35 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 7.
36 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 7.
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over any sale or pledge of a privatized company's assets which the
Government deems to be in conflict with the national interests of
France.3 7
C. Further Protection of National Interests
In addition to the Government's Golden Share, the 1993 Law
reserves other rights that enable the Government to limit foreign
ownership in privatized companies in order to protect national inter-
ests. Restrictions on the number of foreign investors allowed to
purchase privatized French companies had been set at a level of
twenty percent of the capital of the company to be privatized under
the 1986 Law. 8 The Government's bill for the 1993 Law contained no
such restriction, but after Parliamentary debate, the twenty percent of
total capital restriction was reinstated under the 1993 Law.39 How-
ever, the impact of this restriction was significantly reduced as "for-
eign investor" now means "non-European Union investor" and the
twenty percent measurement now applies to the totality of the com-
pany's share capital, not to twenty percent of the offered tranche. In
addition, the twenty percent restriction applies only to the shares be-
ing sold pursuant to the privatization without reference to prior and
concurrent ownership by foreign investors.40 Thus, if the State were
to sell thirty percent of a company's capital to the public, two-thirds of
the offer could be purchased by non-European Union investors4' irre-
spective of the percentage of non-European Union ownership prior to
the transaction. In addition, the twenty percent limit on foreign in-
vestment applies only to the initial public offering and not to secon-
dary sales.4 2
The 1993 Law also provides a five percent limit on foreign invest-
ment in health and defense industries. 43 Unlike the twenty percent
limitation on foreign investment applicable only during the initial pub-
lic offering, the five percent rule applicable to national health and de-
fense industries can be imposed by the Government at any time
during or after the initial sale of shares to the public. In the event
these investment limitations are not respected, Government sanctions
37 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 7.
38 Law 86-912, supra note 1, art. 10.
39 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 8.
40 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 8.
41 La Semaine Juridique (JCP), Ed. G., No. 40, Etude No. 3705, at 397 (dition E.93, 1, 281).
42 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 8.




will be imposed against the undesired investor, including the suppres-
sion of voting rights and the forced sale of shares.44
V. INNOVATIONS OF THE 1993 PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
Although there was a lapse in privatization activity between 1987
and 1993, France did not remain isolated from the developments on
the international capital markets or the need to invigorate its own
markets. With a remarkable willingness to progress motivated by the
market disruption resulting from the October 1987 stock market
crash, the CBV approved new regulations allowing for greater flexibil-
ity in the placement and marketing techniques of shares to be listed
on the stock exchange. In tandem, the Commission des Op'erations de
Bourse (the COB, the French equivalent of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission) modified its registration and prospectus require-
ments to facilitate the sale of shares in privatized companies in the
French and international marketplaces.
45
New placement procedures, such as pre-marketing, bookbuilding,
and purchase by installments, were introduced in France by the
CBV46 and the COB. In addition to allowing private sales to the
noyau dur and mandating offerings to employees, the Privatization
Law includes the authorization to sell shares in privatized companies
in accordance with procedures used on the financial markets.4 7 With
only minimal guidance from the Privatization Law on the placement
procedures to follow,48 the Government has recently applied offering
techniques involving all or a combination of: (1) a public offering in
France open to French citizens or individual residents of France or the
European Union and to French or European Union institutional in-
vestors free from the control of a non-European entity (investors in
this tranche are usually sold only a limited number of shares, although
on a priority basis, and are given a limited number of free shares after
44 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 7.
45 COB Regulation No. 91-02 on "Information to distribute for share listings and for share
offerings for which a listing is requested"; COB Communiqud of September 9, 1993 [hereinafter
COB Communique].
46 Arret6 of August 11, 1993, "CBV General Regulations" (Rdglement General du Conseil
des Bourses de Valeurs) [hereinafter CBV Regulations].
47 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 1.
48 The Privatization Law makes three references to placement of shares in the privatized
companies. Article 4-1, 11 indicates that the sale or exchange of shares and the sale or renuncia-
tion of preferential rights shall be realized through financial market procedures; Article 13
speaks of offers targeted to individuals; and Article 10-1 limits to twenty percent the total
number of shares sold to individual or institutional non-European Union investors. Privatization
Law, supra note 1.
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a holding period of at least eighteen months); (2) a global interna-
tional offering including an offering of shares to French institutions, a
private placement of shares or American Depositary Shares by United
States selling syndicate members into the United States markets
through Rule 144A,49 and an offering of shares in the Euromarkets
(or shares or depositary receipts in the Canadian market); and (3) an
offering to current and former employees of the privatized company
and its controlled affiliates. The foregoing tranches are usually sup-
plemented by an off-market placement to the noyau dur.
Pre-marketing and bookbuilding, new offering techniques, now
allow the issuer and underwriting syndicate to sound out the market in
France prior to the determination of share price. The period of pre-
marketing, named prd-placement, is conducted differently for individ-
uals and institutional investors. Revocable pre-marketing mandates
may now be sought from individual investors, while non-binding indi-
cations of interest from institutional investors are included in the un-
derwriter's order book.
A. Pre-Marketing Mandates
The prg-placement mandate technique was used for the first time
in France during the BNP privatization. 50 Prg-placement mandates al-
low individual investors interested in purchasing shares to sign a
purchase mandate to buy shares conditionally without an agreed price
in the company to be privatized. As the investor would not know the
actual offering price of the shares until the public offering date, the
individual's mandate remains revocable until a specified date after the
offering price is announced. Once this date arrives, and in the absence
of prior revocation by the investor, the mandate becomes automati-
cally irrevocable and the investor is obliged to make the purchase of
shares indicated on the mandate at the public offering price.
Experience with this pre-marketing technique has shown it to be
successful. Overall, during the recent privatizations, only ten percent
of individual investors who participated in pre-marketing have re-
voked their mandates. As a volume indicator, the prg-placement man-
date has proven useful to issuers and underwriters in foreshadowing,
49 Rule 144A under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, a resale exemption allowing placement
of shares to certain qualified institutional buyers in the United States without registering the
offering with the SEC.
50 BNP was privatized in October 1993. The Government has continued to use the pre-
marketing mandate technique in all its recent privatizations.
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through pre-launch indications of interest, the private investor market
potential in the shares to be offered.
B. Bookbuilding
The pre-marketing technique for institutional investors is called
"bookbuilding," a procedure borrowed from United States underwrit-
ing and used for the first time in France during the 1993 privatiza-
tions s.5  Bookbuilding or la construction du livre d'ordres takes place
during the period prior to pricing. During this bookbuilding period in
United States offerings, the underwriting syndicate takes non-binding
orders or "indications of interest" from institutional investors based
on a preliminary prospectus that makes no reference to offering price.
The investors respond with an indication of their interest at different
hypothetical prices. The "orders" are entered into the underwriting
book indicating each institution and the price level or levels at which
such institution would be interested in purchasing shares. The under-
writer's book gives a fairly accurate picture of market demand and is
central to the ultimate determination of offering price.
In France, bookbuilding is used more as a test of market volume
than price.52 In the Rh6ne-Poulenc privatization, for example, the fi-
nancial establishments guaranteeing placement were committed to
communicating to the syndicate head the identity of every major in-
vestor having indicated a firm, but non-binding, interest to invest at
least one million francs in the privatization. Each syndicate member
sent its "book" of investors showing major names, quantity of shares,
and desired investment level.53
Prior to securities law developments initiated by the COB in 1993
and discussed below, it had been impossible to employ the bookbuild-
ing technique in France. The concept of a preliminary prospectus did
not exist and underwriters in France, whose commitment is usually on
a "stand-by" basis, were compelled to accept a far greater risk than
would normally be acceptable to their United States counterparts.
This placement risk created incentive to propose a low offering price
so as to ensure successful sales. Simultaneous offerings of privatized
51 Bookbuilding has been used in Great Britain as well, for the first time during the 1988
British Telecom privatization. The British Government found the technique to be the best
means to ensure that it was extracting the most profit for the maximum sale of shares.
52 Dominique Borde & Aline Poncelet, Le Nouveau Programme de Privatization Frangais de
1993: Une Importante Evolution des Techniques de Mise en Vente sur les Marches Financiers, 8
RDAIMIBLJ 943 (1993).
53 Steven L. Wolfram & David W. Small, Privatisations: Ouverture du Marche, BANQUE,
Dec. 1993, at 30.
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companies in both France and the United States were conceptually
difficult for underwriters to accept as the timing of the placement peri-
ods would not be synchronized: final sales could be effectuated in the
United States rapidly after the price announcement but long before
the post-pricing French marketing period had ended.54 The French
placement system, which had previously not allowed for pre-place-
ments, was considered very risky for American underwriters.
Apart from the noyau dur, no French institutional tranche had
ever been offered for privatizations in France prior to 1993. In addi-
tion to the adverse placement conditions, priority rights of employees,
high demand from individual mandate holders, and foreign institu-
tional buyers in the international tranche left few shares for French
institutional investors. A specific French institutional investor tranche
was made possible in 1993 by the CBV's authorization of parallel of-
ferings.55 As a result, French institutional investors had a greater op-
portunity to invest in the privatizations and, once the COB ironed out
obstacles to pre-marketing, the international capital markets opened
further to placement of shares in French privatized companies world-
wide.
C. COB Regulatory Initiatives
As a first step, the COB implemented a new procedure for exam-
ining the registration statements of companies to be privatized. With
the assistance of the National Company of Auditors,56 the review of
files submitted for privatized companies has been sped up and the
procedures simplified. The second initiative from the COB set out in
a communiqui in September 1993 (the "COB Communique") was a
major policy change in the methods and means by which company
information was to be distributed to the public. The COB restruc-
tured the layout of the required offering documents, developed a doc-
ument summary system, and simplified the procedure by which the
COB's visa is granted to public offering documents.
57
54 Zine Sekfali, Le Droit Francais Des Privatisations a L'Huere Anglo-Saxonnel, BANQUE,
Mars-Avril 1994, at 3.
55 Title 3, Articles 3-2-4 and 3-2-16 and Title 7, Articles 7-1-8 and 7-1-9, of the CBV Regula-
tions, supra note 46, as modified, permitting the issuance of shares by public offering to be
targeted to different categories of investors.
56 Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (CNCC). The CNCC worked to-
gether with the COB to accelerate the review of files for companies selected for privatization.
1993 COB Report, supra note 14, at 107-08.




The COB Communiqu6 modified the basic prospectus require-
ments set out in COB Regulation No. 91-02. Under the new registra-
tion procedure, the prospectus is submitted and reviewed by the COB
over several steps. As an initial filing, an issuer must submit the docu-
ment de r~fdrence which describes the issuer in detail and must be reg-
istered with the COB for its approval. The reference document
submitted to the COB may simply be the company's annual report.
The filing of the annual report remains valid until the publication of
the company financial statements for the next fiscal year and may be
updated from time-to-time with short operational summaries.
The second part of the modified prospectus requirement, intro-
duced for the first time for the 1993 privatizations, is the preparation
of the note d'opgration priliminaire or preliminary offering circular.58
Well-known on the United States markets, the preliminary offering
circular describes the characteristics of the operation to be undertaken
without reference to the share offering price or the timetable for the
offering. The preliminary offering circular is stamped with the COB
visa and, once published and distributed, marks the beginning of the
pre-marketing period. Individual investors receive a copy of the pre-
liminary offering circular during the solicitation of their revocable
mandates, while institutional investors receive one during the simulta-
neous bookbuilding period.
Once the offering price is determined, the note d'op~ration
d'efinitive, or final offering circular, is prepared. This principally in-
volves completing the preliminary offering circular as to price and of-
fering date. The COB stamps the definitive offering circular with its
visa just prior to the launch of the public offering. All investors are
given a copy and "pre-marketed" investors make their choice as to
whether to commit to their purchase orders or to revoke them.
The COB authorized yet another method of information distribu-
tion available for use in the 1993 privatizations. Resume documents,
one-page summaries of the company to be privatized, used for mass
advertising like handbills for the theater, were approved by the COB
for use by issuers. Over three million copies of these summary docu-
ments were distributed to the public during the privatizations of 1993
alone.5 9
Overall, the COB's new prospectus architecture allows for
greater innovation in placement methods while ensuring control and
surveillance by the COB of the information distributed to the public.
58 1993 COB Report, supra note 14, at 111.
59 1993 COB Report, supra note 14, at 112.
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The graduated approval system, from basic reference document to fi-
nal offering circular, permits pre-marketing to investors and thus
makes it possible to shorten the actual selling period during which
underwriters are at risk. The graduated prospectus approval approach
was not meant to be exclusively used in privatizations. It has also
been made available to domestic bond issuers. It is expected that in
years to come, all types of public offering documents for placements
on the French capital markets will follow this revised disclosure
system.
D. Other United States-Inspired Placement Techniques
Other United States-inspired capital markets innovations
adopted in France include the legislation of "green shoe" over-allot-
ments clauses and "claw-back" allocation clauses in the public offering
documents. The CBV General Regulations were amended on August
11, 1993 to provide that any public offering could include an over-
allotment of shares. The issuer may, thus, increase the number of
sales sold by up to twenty-five percent in response to orders re-
ceived.60 Similarly, "claw-back" clauses were permitted in placement
agreements, allowing underwriters to reallocate shares in favor of a
domestic or international market, according to demand. Privately
placed shares could also be shifted to the public market up to certain
limits as the need arose. The BNP, Elf Aquitaine, and Rh6ne-Poulenc
transactions all included "claw-back" provisions and saw them fully
employed.
E. Partly-Paid Shares
A financing technique inspired by the privatizations of British
Telecom and British Gas involving the transfer to the public of partly-
paid shares (paiement 6chelonng) was introduced in France for the
first time under the 1993 Law permitting shares in privatized compa-
nies to be paid for on a partial deferred basis according to conditions
set out by the Minister of the Economy.61 Although employee
purchases had benefitted from a limited deferred payment provision
under the 1986 Law, the 1993 modifications allowed for a more expan-
sive application of partly-paid shares, both in the public offering and
private placement of shares.
60 CBV Regulations, supra note 46, at Title 7, art. 7-1-4 (as amended).
61 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 6.
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Under the 1993 Law, deferred payments are permitted for a pe-
riod of up to three years for publicly offered shares, while no time
limit is imposed for privately placed shares. In the event an investor
defaults on making eventual full payment for its shares, the State au-
tomatically receives full ownership rights to the partly-paid shares and
may resell them onto the market.62 If the State resells the shares
within the calendar quarter prior to the due date of full payment, the
State may reimburse itself (plus late payment interest and expenses)
and the defaulting shareholder will receive the balance. If the State
resells the shares after the expiration of this time period, the default-
ing shareholder recovers nothing of its partial payments. The share-
holder in possession of partly-paid shares is viewed as a debtor of the
Government until the shares are paid in full. It is not clear from the
1993 Law, however, if partly-paid shares sold to a new shareholder
become the debt of the new shareholder or if the debt remains with
the original shareholder. Commentators suggest that the debt to the
Government remains with the initial purchaser who arranged for pay-
ment on a deferred basis.63
F. Privatization Timetable
A state-owned enterprise selected for privatization and included
in the annex of companies that accompanies the 1993 Law can be sold
onto the market without much delay. The most time-consuming steps
involve the due diligence review of the company to be sold and the
preparation of the offering documents. Attention must also be given
to the corporate articles of association, the by-laws, and the manage-
ment structure of the company, which all become subject to French
company or banking law immediately following privatization. Once
the background work is complete, typical privatizations will involve a
four to six week time period.
D - 25 days: Register the Document de Rfirence with the COB and
prepare the Note d'Information Priliminaire.
D - 20: Register Note d'Information Pr~liminaire with the COB.
Commence pr -placement with individuals and
bookbuilding with institutional investors.
62 Privatization Law, supra note 1, art. 6.
63 La Semaine Juridique (JCP), Ed. G., No. 40, Etude: La Loi de Privatization, at 397.
64 Law No. 66-537 of July 24, 1966, [1966] .0. 26 Julliet at 6402, 1966 B.L.D. at 353 for
commercial companies and Law No. 84-46 of Jan. 24, 1984, [1984] J.0. 25 Janv. at 390, 1984
D.S.L. at 148.
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Collect revocable mandates from potential investors.
Determination of offering price. Publication of Note
d'Information D, finitif with visa from the COB.
Date limit on revocability of purchase mandates.
Public Offering closed.
Private Placement closed.
Results of Privatization announced.
Employee Offering closed.
The following table shows the list of companies authorized for
privatization under the-1993 Law and their projected date of sale.65
FRANCE'S PRIVATIZATION SCHEDULE
Company Government Year of sale
stake
Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) 72.9% 1993
Rh6ne-Poulenc 43.4% 1993
Elf Aquitaine66  50.8% 1993/94
Union des Assurances de Paris (UAP) 53.5% 1994
Rdgie Nationale des Usines Renault 70.3% 199467
Compagnie des Machines Bull 72% 1995
Groupe des Assurances Nationales 79.4% 1995?
SEITA 100% 1995?
Caisse Nationale de Pr~voyance 42% 1995?
Pechiney 75% 1995?
SNECMA 97% 1995
Assurances G6nrales de France 72.7% 1995
Air France 99.4% 1996
Compagnie Gfirale Maritime 100% 1996
SNI Aerospatiale 74% 1996
Usinor-Sacilor 75% after 1996
Thomson 82% after 1996
Cr6dit Lyonnais 52.5% after 1996
Soci6t6 Marseillaise de Cr6dit 100% Postponed
Caisse Nationale de R6assurance 100% Postponed
65 EUROMONEY, Sept. 1993, at 284 (updated where possible).
66 Elf-Aquitaine raised receipts of 34.9 billion francs. Combined receipts for the sales of
BNP, Rh6ne-Poulenc, Elf-Aquitaine, and UAP equalled 94.4 billion francs.
67 Following the privatization of Renault, completed in November 1994, the French




While many political and legal obstacles to the privatization of
State-owned enterprises in France have been moved aside, the state of
health of the French economy and market conditions both in France
and internationally still play a factor in the timing of future privatiza-
tions. Financially troubled companies such as Air France and Credit
Lyonnais, which have required large cash infusions from the Govern-
ment in recent months, are unlikely to be offered for sale until they
can show prospects of becoming profitable. Difficult economic times
in Europe, along with ongoing losses at these companies, make quick
corporate recovery seem unlikely. Nevertheless, the Government has
made a positive start to its privatization program by reaching its 1994
target of raising fifty-five billion francs on receipts from sales of State
assets. There is pressure to maintain this momentum and the Govern-
ment has already set the same target of fifty-five billion francs again
for its privatizations in 1995. There is comfort in the fact that the legal
structure for these offerings is finally in place.
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